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Case No.: S0300CV202300214 HON DAN'R SLAYTON

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SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

COUNTY OF COCONINO

SCOTT JABLOW, an individual; SANDY MORIARTY, an individual; KATHY KINSELLA, an individual; TOM LAMKIN, an individual; HOLLI PLOOG, an individual; JON THOMPSON, an individual; JÉSSICA WILLIAMSON, an individual; PAUL SCHLEGEL, an individual; KURT CHRISTIANSON, an individual; and BRIAN ARMSTRONG, an individual.

Plaintiffs,

VS.

SHELLEY EVANS and JOHN DOE EVANS, wife and husband; DONNA JOY VARNEY and JOHN DOE VARNEY, wife and husband; ALISSA TYLER and JOHN DOE TYLER, wife and husband: CHARLES TYLER and JANE DOE TYLER, husband and wife; GAYLE BAINGO and JOHN DOE BAINGO, wife and husband; THERESA VOS and JOHN DOE VOS, wife and husband; and PATTY HANSEN, in her official capacity as the

Defendants.

Case No.

COMPLAINT

Coconino County Recorder,

For their Complaint against Defendants, Plaintiffs Scott Jablow, Sandy Moriarty, Kathy Kinsella, Tom Lamkin, Holli Ploog, Jon Thompson, Jessica Williamson, Paul Schlegel, Kurt Christianson, and Brian Armstrong (sometimes referred to collectively as "Plaintiffs") allege as follows:

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NATURE OF THE ACTION

1. In the summer of 2022, Defendants Shelley Evans, Donna Joy Varney, Alissa Tyler, Charles Tyler, Gayle Baingo, and Theresa Vos recorded bogus liens against various officials of the City of Sedona, including the Mayor, City Councilors, the City Magistrate Judge, the City Attorney, and the Senior Code Enforcement Officer. These baseless filings demanded that these officials pay Defendants *millions of dollars* based on non-existent "Constitution and Bill of Rights violations." These filings were nothing more than an attempt to bully, harass, and intimidate these public officials. The purpose of this action is to publicly expose Defendants' paper terrorism, to obtain redress for Defendants' unlawful acts, and to expunge these baseless filings from the public record.

PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE

- 2. Plaintiff Scott Jablow is the Mayor of the City of Sedona ("City"). At certain times relevant to this Complaint, he was the Vice Mayor of the City.
- 3. Plaintiff Sandy Moriarty is the former Mayor of the City, and held that position at all times relevant to this Complaint.
- 4. Plaintiff Kathy Kinsella is a member of the City Council, and held that position at all times relevant to this Complaint.
- 5. Plaintiff Tom Lamkin is a former member of the City Council, and held that position at all times relevant to this Complaint.
- 6. Plaintiff Holli Ploog is a member of the City Council, and held that position at all times relevant to this Complaint.
- 7. Plaintiff Jon Thompson is a former member of the City Council, and held that position at all times relevant to this Complaint.
- 8. Plaintiff Jessica Williamson is a member of the City Council, and held that position at all times relevant to this Complaint.
- 9. Plaintiff Paul Schlegel is the City Magistrate Judge, and held that position at all times relevant to this Complaint.

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- 10. Plaintiff Kurt Christianson is the City Attorney, and held that position at all times relevant to this Complaint.
- 11. Plaintiff Brian Armstrong is the Senior Code Enforcement Officer for the City, and held that position at all times relevant to this Complaint.
- 12. Defendants Shelley Evans and John Doe Evans are wife and husband and, upon information and belief, reside in Yavapai County.
- 13. All acts alleged to have been performed by Defendant Shelley Evans were done for and on her own behalf and on behalf of the marital community.
- 14. Defendants Donna Joe Varney and John Doe Varney are wife and husband and, upon information and belief, reside in Yavapai County.
- 15. All acts alleged to have been performed by Defendant Donna Joe Varney were done for and on her own behalf and on behalf of the marital community.
- 16. Defendants Alissa Tyler and John Doe Tyler are wife and husband and, upon information and belief, reside in Yavapai County.
- 17. All acts alleged to have been performed by Defendant Alissa Tyler were done for and on her own behalf and on behalf of the marital community.
- 18. Defendants Charles Tyler and Jane Doe Tyler are wife and husband and, upon information and belief, reside in Yavapai County.
- 19. All acts alleged to have been performed by Defendant Charles Tyler were done for and on his own behalf and on behalf of the marital community.
- 20. Defendants Gayle Baingo and John Doe Baingo are wife and husband and, upon information and belief, reside in Yavapai County.
- 21. All acts alleged to have been performed by Defendant Gayle Baingo were done for and on her own behalf and on behalf of the marital community.
- 22. Defendants Theresa Vos and John Doe Vos are wife and husband and, upon information and belief, reside in Yavapai County.
- 23. All acts alleged to have been performed by Defendant Theresa Vos were done for and on her own behalf and on behalf of the marital community.

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- 24. Defendant Patty Hansen is the Coconino County Recorder, and is named here in her official capacity only.
- 25. This Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the action and personal jurisdiction over the parties.
 - 26. Venue is proper in Coconino County.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The "Sovereign Citizen" Movement

- 27. Defendants are members of a so-called "sovereign citizen" group.
- 28. According to one source:

Sovereign citizens ... claim that they are not subject to most taxes, are not citizens of the United States (but instead are 'non-resident aliens'), cannot be tried for crimes in which there is no complaining victim (zoning and professional licensing violations, for instance), and are only subject to "common law courts," a sort of people's tribunal with no lawyers. Most refuse to obtain Social Security cards, register their vehicles, carry driver's licenses or use zip codes; many refer to UCC-107, a part of the Uniform Commercial Code, to justify their bizarre claims; and some use weird forms of punctuation between their middle and last names in all kinds of documents.¹

- 29. The FBI "has designated sovereign citizens as a domestic terrorist movement and a growing threat to law enforcement," according to a report from the National Association of Secretaries of State. By some estimates, there are as many as 300,000 so-called sovereign citizens in the U.S.²
- 30. In what some experts have called "paper terrorism," these so-called sovereign citizens are also known for filing baseless liens against public officials in an effort to harass and intimidate them. "Despite dozens of laws passed in different states in the 1990s and

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¹ https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/intelligence-report/2015/what-sovereign-citizen, accessed on April 5, 2023.

² https://archive.knoxnews.com/news/crime-courts/experts-bogus-liens-common-tactic-of-sovereign-citizens-3461859d-11dc-520d-e053-0100007f938e-381826211.html/,accessed on April 5, 2023.

2000s to deal with the problem, it still is a very effective tactic, and commonly used by sovereign citizens."³

31. In Arizona, harassing public officials through the filing of baseless nonconsensual liens is a criminal offense. Specifically, A.R.S. § 13-2921(B) provides as follows:

A person commits harassment against a public officer or employee if the person, with intent to harass, files a nonconsensual lien against any public officer or employee that is not accompanied by an order or a judgment from a court of competent jurisdiction authorizing the filing of the lien or is not issued by a governmental entity or political subdivision or agency pursuant to its statutory authority, a validly licensed utility or water delivery company, a mechanics' lien claimant or an entity created under covenants, conditions, restrictions or declarations affecting real property [emphasis added].

- 32. A violation of the above-quoted statute is a Class 5 felony. A.R.S. § 13-2921(C).
- 33. Despite A.R.S. § 13-2921 and civil statutes prohibiting the filing of bogus liens, Defendants filed two baseless nonconsensual liens against Plaintiffs.

Defendants' Baseless Lien Filings

The First "Notice of Distress"

- 34. On June 3, 2022, Defendant Shelley Evans caused to be recorded with the Coconino County Recorder's Office a "Notice of Distress of Bond" ("First Notice of Distress"), Document Number 3952110. A true and correct copy of the First Notice of Distress is attached as **Exhibit 1**.
- 35. In the First Notice of Distress, Defendant Evans listed her name as "Shelley Evans® 2020."

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³ https://www.adl.org/sites/default/files/documents/assets/pdf/combating-hate/Lawless-Ones-2012-Edition-WEB-final.pdf, accessed on April 5, 2023.

- 36. On the date the First Notice of Distress was filed, Plaintiffs Jablow, Moriarty, Kinsella, Lamkin, Ploog, Thompson, and Williamson were the Mayor and Councilors of the City, and Plaintiff Christianson was the City Attorney (collectively, the "Officials").
- 37. The First Notice of Distress referred to the Officials as "lien debtor[s]/tort feasor[s]" and stated that the Officials have violated the constitutional rights of Defendants Varney, Alissa Tyler, Charles Tyler, Baingo, and Vos.
- 38. In the First Notice of Distress, Defendant Alissa Tyler's name was listed as "Alissa Tyler® 2020"; Defendant Charles Tyler's name was listed as "Charles Tyler® 2020"; and Defendant Gayle Baingo's name was listed as "Gayle Baingo® 2020."
- 39. In the First Notice of Distress, Defendants Varney, Alissa Tyler, Charles Tyler, Baingo, and Vos claimed that the Officials had committed 280 "Constitution and Bill of Rights violations valued at \$5,000 per violation times eight (8) Lien Debtors for a total value" of \$11,200,000.
- 40. The First Notice of Distress purports to create a "commercial lien" against the "operational/commercial bonds of each of the [Officials]," but goes on to state that, if the "bond(s) of the [Officials] is/are insufficient," then Defendants assert liens against "all the real and movable property and bank and savings accounts" of the Officials.
- 41. The First Notice of Distress also contained a section titled "Invoice," which stated that "DEMAND IS NOW MADE UPON Sandy Moriarty, Kurt Christianson, Scott Jablow, Kathy Kinsella, Tom Lamkin, Holli Ploog, Jon Thompson, and Jessica Williamson individually or severally for the sum of Eleven Million Two Hundred Thousand DOLS and Zero CTS [sic]."

The Second "Notice of Distress"

42. On July 15, 2022, Defendant Shelley Evans caused to be recorded with the Coconino County Recorder's Office a "Notice of Distress of Bond" ("Second Notice of Distress"), Document Number 3955183. A true and correct copy of the Second Notice of Distress is attached as **Exhibit 2**.

/IS OIS 43. In the Second Notice of Distress, Defendant Evans listed her name as "Shelley Evans® 2020."

- 44. On the date the Second Notice of Distress was filed, Plaintiff Paul Schlegel was the City's Magistrate Judge and Plaintiff Brian Armstrong was the Senior Code Enforcement Officer for the City.
- 45. The Second Notice of Distress referred to the Plaintiffs Schlegel and Armstrong as "lien debtor[s]/tort feasor[s]" and stated that they had violated the constitutional rights of Defendant Evans.
- 46. In the Second Notice of Distress, Defendant Evans claimed that Plaintiffs Schlegel and Armstrong had committed 111 "Constitution and Bill of Rights violations valued at \$5,000 per violation times two (2) Lien Debtors for a total value" of \$1,110,000.
- 47. The Second Notice of Distress purports to create a "commercial lien" against the "operational/commercial bonds of [Plaintiffs Schlegel and Armstrong]," but goes on to state that, if the "bond(s) of [Schlegel and Armstrong] is/are insufficient," then Defendant Evans asserts liens against "all the real and movable property and bank and savings accounts" of Schlegel and Armstrong.
- 48. The Second Notice of Distress also contained a section titled "Invoice," which stated that "DEMAND IS NOW MADE UPON Paul Schlegel and Brian Armstrong individually or severally for the sum of one million one hundred ten thousand DOLS and Zero CTS [sic]."
- 49. The City does not post "operational bonds" on behalf of individual public officials. Instead, the City pays for Faithful Performance of Duty Coverage through the Arizona Municipal Risk Retention Pool, the coverage for which is limited to \$500,000.
- 50. Therefore, because there are no "operational bonds" to which a lien could attach, the Notices of Distress necessarily asserted a lien against the real and personal property of Plaintiffs.
- 51. Defendants' attempt to assert a "lien" against the "operational bonds" of Plaintiffs was per se unlawful. Even if the "bonds" existed, there is no legal basis for

Defendants to simply assert a lien against them—much less liens totaling millions of dollars—absent a judicial determination of wrongdoing by the Officials.

- 52. If Defendants believed that Plaintiffs have violated their constitutional rights, then the appropriate course of action would have been to file a lawsuit and seek appropriate relief in court—not to file a "lien" against the "bonds" (which, again, do not exist). A.R.S. § 9-302(A).
- 53. Defendants could not reasonably have believed that asserting a "lien" against the "operational bonds" of Plaintiffs was lawful or appropriate. Indeed, Defendants knew that the "liens" were groundless and not authorized by any legal authority. Their sole aim in recording them was to harass Plaintiffs.

Defendants' Unlawful Refusal to Release the Liens

- 54. On or about June 15, 2022, Plaintiff Christianson—who is a licensed attorney and the City Attorney for the City of Sedona—wrote a letter to Defendant Alissa Tyler on behalf of himself and Plaintiffs Jablow, Moriarty, Kinsella, Lamkin, Ploog, Thompson, and Williamson demanding that she release the lien purportedly created by the First Notice of Distress. A true and correct copy of Plaintiff Christianson's letter is attached as **Exhibit 3**.
- 55. On or about June 21, 2022, Defendant Alissa Tyler responded to Plaintiff Christianson's letter saying that "[a] Notice was recorded and cannot be withdrawn, nor do I wish to do so. The statute your correspondence references refers to liens and is not pertinent in this case." A true and correct copy of Defendant Alissa Tyler's letter to Plaintiff Christianson is attached as **Exhibit 4**.
- 56. Defendant Alissa Tyler's June 21, 2022, letter was signed by Defendant Alissa Tyler and by Defendant Evans.
- 57. On or about June 15, 2022, Plaintiff Christianson wrote a letter to Defendant Baingo on behalf of himself and Plaintiffs Jablow, Moriarty, Kinsella, Lamkin, Ploog, Thompson, and Williamson demanding that she release the lien purportedly created by the First Notice of Distress. A true and correct copy of Plaintiff Christianson's letter is attached as **Exhibit 5**.



- 58. On or about June 21, 2022, Defendant Baingo responded to Plaintiff Christianson's letter saying that "I cannot retract a notice. Furthermore, the statute you are quoting does not pertain to the document recorded." A true and correct copy of Defendant Baingo's letter to Plaintiff Christianson is attached as **Exhibit 6**.
- 59. Defendant Baingo's June 21, 2022, letter was signed by Defendant Baingo and by Defendant Evans.
- 60. On or about June 15, 2022, Plaintiff Christianson wrote a letter to Defendant Charles Tyler on behalf of himself and Plaintiffs Jablow, Moriarty, Kinsella, Lamkin, Ploog, Thompson, and Williamson demanding that he release the lien purportedly created by the First Notice of Distress. A true and correct copy of Plaintiff Christianson's letter is attached as **Exhibit 7**.
- 61. On or about June 21, 2022, Defendant Charles Tyler responded to Plaintiff Christianson's letter saying that "[a] Notice was recorded and cannot be withdrawn, nor do I wish to do so. The statute your correspondence references refers to liens, and is not pertinent to this case." A true and correct copy of Defendant Charles Tyler's letter to Plaintiff Christianson is attached as **Exhibit 8**.
- 62. Defendant Charles Tyler's June 21, 2022, letter was signed by Defendant Charles Tyler and by Defendant Evans.
- 63. On or about June 15, 2022, Plaintiff Christianson wrote a letter to Defendant Varney on behalf of himself and Plaintiffs Jablow, Moriarty, Kinsella, Lamkin, Ploog, Thompson, and Williamson demanding that she release the lien purportedly created by the First Notice of Distress. A true and correct copy of Plaintiff Christianson's letter is attached as **Exhibit 9**.
- 64. On or about June 21, 2022, Defendant Varney responded to Plaintiff Christianson's letter saying that "[a] Notice of Distress was recorded. We cannot retract a notice. Additionally, the statute you referenced applies to liens, and is not pertinent." A true and correct copy of Defendant Varney's letter to Plaintiff Christianson is attached as **Exhibit** 10.

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- 65. Defendant Varney's June 21, 2022, letter was signed by Defendant Varney and by Defendant Evans.
- 66. On or about June 15, 2022, Plaintiff Christianson wrote a letter to Defendant Vos on behalf of himself and Plaintiffs Jablow, Moriarty, Kinsella, Lamkin, Ploog, Thompson, and Williamson demanding that she release the lien purportedly created by the First Notice of Distress. A true and correct copy of Plaintiff Christianson's letter is attached as **Exhibit 11**.
- 67. On or about June 21, 2022, Defendant Vos responded to Plaintiff Christianson's letter saying that "[y]our correspondence does not apply to a Notice of Distress, which is what was recorded, and neither does the statute provided." A true and correct copy of Defendant Vos's letter to Plaintiff Christianson is attached as **Exhibit 12**.
- 68. Defendant Vos's June 21, 2022, letter was signed by Defendant Vos and by Defendant Evans.
- 69. On or about July 21, 2022, Plaintiff Christianson wrote a letter to Defendant Evans on behalf of Plaintiffs Schlegel and Armstrong demanding that she release the lien purportedly created by the Second Notice of Distress. A true and correct copy of Plaintiff Christianson's letter is attached as **Exhibit 13**.
- 70. On or about July 27, 2022, Defendant Evans responded to Plaintiff Christianson's letter. Despite receiving Plaintiff Christianson's letter, Defendant Evans refused to release the lien purportedly created by the Second Notice of Distress. A true and correct copy of Defendant Evans' July 27, 2022, letter is attached as **Exhibit 14**.
- 71. On September 21, 2022, the Coconino County Attorney's Office filed a Notice of Invalid Lien relating to the First Notice of Distress, Document No. 3960295. A true and correct copy of the notice is attached as **Exhibit 15**.
- 72. Also on September 21, 2022, the Coconino County Attorney's Office filed a Notice of Invalid Lien relating to the Second Notice of Distress, Document No. 3960296. A true and correct copy of the notice is attached as **Exhibit 16**.

- 73. Despite the County Attorney's invalid-lien notices, Defendants still failed and refused to release the liens purportedly created by the First and Second Notices of Distress.
- 74. On October 5, 2022, Defendant Evans caused two documents to be filed in the Coconino County Recorder's Office, each titled a "Notice of Difficiency" [sic]. These documents, Document Nos. 3961670 and 3961671, respectively, are attached as **Exhibits 17 and 18**.
- 75. In each of the "Notices of Difficiency" [sic], Defendant Evans—speaking on her own behalf and as the agent for Defendants Varney, Alissa Tyler, Charles Tyler, Baingo, and Vos—declared that "[t]he Notice of Distress stands." In other words, Defendants once again affirmed their refusal to withdraw the liens purportedly created by the First and Second Notices of Distress.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

Count One (Recording False Documents – A.R.S. § 33-420(A)) First Notice of Distress Against Defendant Evans

- 76. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.
- 77. A.R.S. § 33-420(A) provides that:

A person purporting to claim an interest in, or a lien or encumbrance against, real property, who causes a document asserting such claim to be recorded in the office of the county recorder, knowing or having reason to know that the document is forged, groundless, contains a material misstatement or false claim or is otherwise invalid is liable to the owner or beneficial title holder of the real property for the sum of not less than five thousand dollars, or for treble the actual damages caused by the recording, whichever is greater, and reasonable attorney fees and costs of the action.

- 78. The statute also provides that a purported lien against real property that is "not authorized by statute, judgment or other specific legal authority *is presumed to be groundless and invalid.*" *Id.* § 33-420(D) (emphasis added).
- 79. Defendant Evans caused the First Notice of Distress to be recorded with the Coconino County Recorder's Office.



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- 80. The First Notice of Distress purported to create a lien or encumbrance against the real property of Plaintiffs Jablow, Moriarty, Kinsella, Lamkin, Ploog, Thompson, Williamson, and Christianson.
- 81. The First Notice of Distress purported to claim an interest in the real property of Plaintiffs Jablow, Moriarty, Kinsella, Lamkin, Ploog, Thompson, Williamson, and Christianson by Defendants Varney, Alissa Tyler, Charles Tyler, Baingo, and Vos.
- 82. The First Notice of Distress was groundless and invalid because it was not authorized by statute, judgment, or other specific legal authority.
- 83. Defendant Shelley Evans knew or had reason to know that the First Notice of Distress is groundless, contains a material misstatement or false claim, or is otherwise invalid.
- 84. Pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-420(A), Defendant Shelley Evans is therefore liable to Plaintiffs Jablow, Moriarty, Kinsella, Lamkin, Ploog, Thompson, Williamson, and Christianson for the sum of not less than \$5,000, or for treble the actual damages caused by the recording, whichever is greater.
- 85. Defendant Evans is also liable to Plaintiffs Jablow, Moriarty, Kinsella, Lamkin, Ploog, Thompson, Williamson, and Christianson for their attorneys' fees and costs incurred herein pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-420(A).

Count Two (Recording False Documents – A.R.S. § 33-420(C)) **First Notice of Distress** Against Defendants Varney, Alissa Tyler, Charles Tyler, Baingo, and Vos

- 86. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.
- 87. A.R.S. § 33-420(C) provides that:

A person who is named in a document which purports to create an interest in, or a lien or encumbrance against, real property and who knows that the document is forged, groundless, contains a material misstatement or false claim or is otherwise invalid shall be liable to the owner or title holder for the sum of not less than one thousand dollars, or for treble actual damages, whichever is greater, and reasonable attorney fees and costs as provided in this section, if he wilfully refuses to release or correct such document of record

within twenty days from the date of a written request from the owner or beneficial title holder of the real property.

- 88. The First Notice of Distress purported to create a lien or encumbrance against the real property of Plaintiffs Jablow, Moriarty, Kinsella, Lamkin, Ploog, Thompson, Williamson, and Christianson.
- 89. Defendants Varney, Alissa Tyler, Charles Tyler, Baingo, and Vos were named in the First Notice of Distress as claiming an interest in the real property of Plaintiffs Jablow, Moriarty, Kinsella, Lamkin, Ploog, Thompson, Williamson, and Christianson.
- 90. The First Notice of Distress is groundless, contains a material misstatement or false claim, or is otherwise invalid.
- 91. Defendants Varney, Alissa Tyler, Charles Tyler, Baingo, and Vos knew that the First Notice of Distress was groundless, contains a material misstatement or false claim, or is otherwise invalid.
- 92. Defendants Varney, Alissa Tyler, Charles Tyler, Baingo, and Vos willfully refused to release or correct the First Notice of Distress within twenty days of a written request from the owner or beneficial title holder of the real property.
- 93. Pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-420(C), Defendants Varney, Alissa Tyler, Charles Tyler, Baingo, and Vos are liable to Plaintiffs Jablow, Moriarty, Kinsella, Lamkin, Ploog, Thompson, Williamson, and Christianson for the sum of not less than \$1,000, or for treble actual damages, whichever is greater.
- 94. Pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-420(C), Defendants Varney, Alissa Tyler, Charles Tyler, Baingo, and Vos are liable to Plaintiffs Jablow, Moriarty, Kinsella, Lamkin, Ploog, Thompson, Williamson, and Christianson for their reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred herein.

Count Three (Recording False Documents – A.R.S. § 33-420(A)) Second Notice of Distress Against Defendant Evans

- 95. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.
- 96. A.R.S. § 33-420(A) provides that:

A person purporting to claim an interest in, or a lien or encumbrance against, real property, who causes a document asserting such claim to be recorded in the office of the county recorder, knowing or having reason to know that the document is forged, groundless, contains a material misstatement or false claim or is otherwise invalid is liable to the owner or beneficial title holder of the real property for the sum of not less than five thousand dollars, or for treble the actual damages caused by the recording, whichever is greater, and reasonable attorney fees and costs of the action.

- 97. The statute also provides that a purported lien against real property that is "not authorized by statute, judgment or other specific legal authority *is presumed to be groundless and invalid.*" *Id.* § 33-420(D) (emphasis added).
- 98. Defendant Evans caused the Second Notice of Distress to be recorded with the Coconino County Recorder's Office.
- 99. The Second Notice of Distress purported to create a lien or encumbrance against the real property of Plaintiffs Schlegel and Armstrong.
- 100. The Second Notice of Distress purported to claim an interest in the real property of Plaintiffs Schlegel and Armstrong by Defendant Evans.
- 101. The Second Notice of Distress was groundless and invalid because it was not authorized by statute, judgment, or other specific legal authority.
- 102. Pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-420(A), Defendant Shelley Evans is therefore liable to Plaintiffs Schlegel and Armstrong for the sum of not less than \$5,000, or for treble the actual damages caused by the recording, whichever is greater.
- 103. Defendant Evans is also liable to Plaintiffs Schlegel and Armstrong for their attorneys' fees and costs incurred herein pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-420(A).

Count Four (Recording False Documents – A.R.S. § 33-420(C)) Second Notice of Distress <u>Against Defendant Evans</u>

- 104. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.
- 105. A.R.S. § 33-420(C) provides that:

A person who is named in a document which purports to create an interest in, or a lien or encumbrance against, real property and who knows that the document is forged, groundless, contains a material misstatement or false

claim or is otherwise invalid shall be liable to the owner or title holder for the sum of not less than one thousand dollars, or for treble actual damages, whichever is greater, and reasonable attorney fees and costs as provided in this section, if he wilfully refuses to release or correct such document of record within twenty days from the date of a written request from the owner or beneficial title holder of the real property.

- 106. The Second Notice of Distress purported to create a lien or encumbrance against the real property of Plaintiffs Schlegel and Armstrong.
- 107. Defendants Evans was named in the Second Notice of Distress as claiming an interest in the real property of Plaintiffs Schlegel and Armstrong.
- 108. The Second Notice of Distress is groundless, contains a material misstatement or false claim or is otherwise invalid.
- 109. Defendant Evans knew that the Second Notice of Distress was groundless, contains a material misstatement or false claim, or is otherwise invalid.
- 110. Defendant Evans willfully refused to release or correct the Second Notice of Distress within twenty days of a written request from the owner or beneficial title holder of the real property.
- 111. Pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-420(C), Defendant Evans is liable to Plaintiffs Schlegel and Armstrong for the sum of not less than \$1,000, or for treble actual damages, whichever is greater.
- 112. Pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-420(C), Defendant Evans is liable to Plaintiffs Schlegel and Armstrong for their reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred herein.

Count Five (Invalid Recorded Document – A.R.S. § 33-421) First Notice of Distress Against All Defendants

- 113. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.
- 114. A.R.S. § 33-421(A), provides that:

A nonconsensual lien, other than a lien recorded by a governmental entity or political subdivision or agency, a validly licensed utility or water delivery company, a mechanics' lien claimant or an entity created under covenants, conditions, restrictions or declarations affecting real property, shall not be

recorded unless the lien is accompanied by an order or judgment from a court of competent jurisdiction authorizing the filing of the lien.

- 115. Section 33-421(C) further provides that "[t]he county recorder shall not record any lien except as prescribed in subsection A or otherwise authorized by law unless the lien is accompanied by the notarized signature of the debtor on a document acknowledging the filing and recording of the lien."
 - 116. The First Notice of Distress was a nonconsensual lien.
- 117. The First Notice of Distress was not recorded by a government entity or any of the other exempt entities under A.R.S. § 33-421, was not accompanied by a court order or judgment, and was not accompanied by the Officials' notarized signatures acknowledging the filing and recording of the notices.
- 118. Accordingly, the First Notice of Distress was improperly recorded pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-421.
- 119. The Officials are entitled to (1) a judicial declaration that the First Notice of Distress is invalid pursuant to § 33-421, and (2) an order directing the County Recorder, Defendant Hansen, to expunge the First Notice of Distress.
- 120. In the alternative, the Officials are entitled to an order directing the County Recorder, Defendant Hansen, to expunge the First Notice of Distress pursuant to the Court's inherent powers.

Count Six (Invalid Recorded Document – A.R.S. § 33-421) Second Notice of Distress Against Defendant Evans and Hansen

- 121. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.
- 122. A.R.S. § 33-421(A), provides that:

A nonconsensual lien, other than a lien recorded by a governmental entity or political subdivision or agency, a validly licensed utility or water delivery company, a mechanics' lien claimant or an entity created under covenants, conditions, restrictions or declarations affecting real property, shall not be recorded unless the lien is accompanied by an order or judgment from a court of competent jurisdiction authorizing the filing of the lien.

- 123. Section 33-421(C) further provides that "[t]he county recorder shall not record any lien except as prescribed in subsection A or otherwise authorized by law unless the lien is accompanied by the notarized signature of the debtor on a document acknowledging the filing and recording of the lien."
 - 124. The Second Notice of Distress was a nonconsensual lien.
- 125. The Second Notice of Distress was not recorded by a government entity or any of the other exempt entities under A.R.S. § 33-421, was not accompanied by a court order or judgment, and was not accompanied by the Officials' notarized signatures acknowledging the filing and recording of the notices.
- 126. Accordingly, the Second Notice of Distress was improperly recorded pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-421.
- 127. Plaintiffs Schlegel and Armstrong are entitled to (1) a judicial declaration that the Second Notice of Distress is invalid pursuant to § 33-421, and (2) an order directing the County Recorder, Defendant Hansen, to expunge the Second Notice of Distress.
- 128. In the alternative, Plaintiffs Schlegel and Armstrong are entitled to an order directing the County Recorder, Defendant Hansen, to expunge the Second Notice of Distress pursuant to the Court's inherent powers.

Count Seven (Declaratory Relief) <u>Against All Defendants</u>

- 129. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint.
- 130. Pursuant to the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, A.R.S. § 12-1831, et seq., this Court has the power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed.
- 131. There is an actual controversy between Plaintiffs on the one hand, and Defendants on the other, with regard to the effect and validity of the First and Second Notices of Distress.

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132. Plaintiffs are entitled to a judicial declaration that the First Notice of Distress and the Second Notice of Distress (1) are nonconsensual liens, and (2) are groundless, contain a material misstatement or false claim, or are otherwise invalid.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for relief as follows:

- A. For an award of statutory damages pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-421, as set forth above;
- B. For a judicial declaration that the Notices of Distress are invalid pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-421;
- C. For an order directing the Coconino County Recorder, Defendant Hansen, to expunge the Notices of Distress pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-421 and/or the Court's inherent powers;
- D. For a judicial declaration under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, A.R.S. § 12-1831, *et seq.*, that the Notices of Distress (1) are nonconsensual liens, and (2) are groundless, contain a material misstatement or false claim, or are otherwise invalid;
- E. For an award of attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to A.R.S. § 33-420(A);
- F. For an award of costs under A.R.S. § 12-341; and
- G. For such other and further relief the Court deems appropriate under the circumstances.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 20th day of April, 2023.

LEWIS BRISBOIS BISGAARD & SMITH LLP

By: /s/ Aaron C. Schepler
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